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Abstract
Financial economic models often assume that investors know (or agree
on) the fundamental value of the shares of the firm, easing the passage
from the individual to the collective dimension of the financial system gen-
erated by the Share Exchange over time. Our model relaxes that heroic
assumption of one unique ”true value” and deals with the formation of
share market prices through the dynamic formation of individual and so-
cial opinions (or beliefs) based upon a fundamental signal of economic
performance and position of the firm, the forecast revision by heteroge-
neous individual investors, and their social mood or sentiment about the
ongoing state of the market pricing process. Market clearing price for-
mation is then featured by individual and group dynamics that make its
collective dimension irreducible to its individual level. This dynamic holis-
tic approach can be applied to better understand the market exuberance
generated by the Share Exchange over time.
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1 Introduction
Advances in heterogeneous agents modeling from economics [1, 2] and complex
systems dynamics in sociophysics [3, 4] call for an understanding of the working
of the financial market based upon the collective and dynamic properties of sys-
tems featured by interacting parts and structures. These elements can be atoms
or macromolecules in a physical context, as well as people, firms or regulated
Exchanges in a socio-economic context. These approaches aim then to analyze
the properties of socio-economic systems over time by focusing on interactions,
relationships and the overall architecture of them.
Drawing upon these advances, this paper integrates the phenomenon of opin-
ion dynamics studied by sociophysics [5, 6] to an economic dynamic model of
market price formation over time through hazard and interaction [7]. The study
of opinion dynamics has been a long and intensive subject of research among
physicists working in sociophysics [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]: we apply here the
Galam sequential probabilistic majority model of opinion dynamics [14, 15, 16].
During the last decades, financial market analysis has assisted to the pro-
liferation of financial economic models that relax received assumptions of full
knowledge, individual rationality and market efficiency. However, many mod-
els remain somewhat tied to an equilibrium approach to the formation of share
market prices over time. This approach entails a pricing rule that satisfies all the
market orders simultaneously passed by all investors in the purpose to maximize
their expected utilities. This approach actually implies a peculiar understand-
ing of the market coordination between individual investors. This coordination
is supposed to be achieved in a solitary moment beyond time and context [17]
when all investors contemplate the past, present and future of the business firm
and univocally agree on its fundamental value of reference.
Once this unanimous consensus achieved, they perform market transactions
at that price, which does not change unless the fundamental value of the firm
does change [18]. Therefore, the share market price is supposed to incorporate
(all the available information on) the fundamental value of the firm at every
instant [19, 20]. The share market price becomes a sufficient statistics of the
fundamental value of the firm [21], and investors are then supposed to know (or
agree with) the fundamental value of its shares, even though the current market
price may diverge from this ”true value” in some ways over time. The under-
standing and the modeling of market pricing, and the dynamics of individual
and collective opinions, are then driven by this assumption of uniqueness of the
value of the firm.
Our model relaxes this heroic assumption of the market price as the best
evidence of the ”true value,” and deals with the formation of share market price
of one firm through the dynamic formation of individual and social opinions
(or beliefs) based upon a fundamental signal Ft on the economic performance
and position of the firm, the market clearing price of each share pt, and a
social mood (or sentiment) mt on the ongoing state of market pricing process.
Accordingly, individual investors are assumed to form their personal opinions
- which orient their financial decisions of sell or hold, and buy or wait - in a
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fundamentally interactive context [22]. At every instant k, each investor i does
form its opinions respectively on the evolution of corporate fundamentals and
the market clearing price that is continuously changed by achieved transactions
through the Share Exchange.
Nothing can assure one investor about the permanent alignment between his
opinion on the evolving fundamentals, its opinion on the current market price,
and the market price itself [23]; nor can he be sure that the market order -
which he passes through the Share Exchange according to those opinions - may
be eventually satisfied. In this dynamic setting, the formation of share prices
critically depends on both the interactive formation of social opinions among
investors, and their common knowledge of corporate fundamentals over time.
Every investor strives then to revise its price expectations Et(pt+1)|i according
to the dynamics of the fundamental signal Ft and the social market sentiment
mt.
2 Definition of Variables and Timing
The formation of share market price over time depends here on the dynamic
formation of individual and social opinions (or beliefs) based upon a fundamen-
tal signal Ft on the economic performance and position of the firm, the market
clearing price of each share pt, and a social mood (or sentiment) m
j
t about the
market pricing. These three dimensions (or layers, or orders) correspond to
three different rhythms of change, that is, three different timings:
• Ft,h, the fundamental signal, has the slowest rhythm or the largest lag
(duration). This means that Ft can be constant for t+ h periods; it lasts
for h periods;
• pt, the market clearing price, when exist, changes at each period t;
• mjt,k, the social mood, has the quickest rhythm or the shortest lag. At
each period t, its value is the final result of k interactions; each mood lasts
indeed for 1
k
periods.
Two distinctive forces drive then the market clearing price formation trough
time. From one side, ongoing market pricing is submitted to individual guesses
and intentions, hopes and fears, subsumed by the social mood mjt,k and its
quickest interactions; from another side, it is concerned with the slowest history
of reporting and disclosure that, in principle, may be partly public, consistent,
and conventionally agreed. This general system (which is no longer an equi-
librium)1 consists in and depends upon the coherence and universal diffusion
of relevant and reliable knowledge through a price system (providing market
information) and an accounting system (disclosing firm-specific, fundamental
information) publicly determined and announced.
In particular, the fundamental signal is assumed to be common knowledge
among all investors:
1Our analysis distinguishes system and equilibrium as distinctive concepts.
3
• Ft is the fundamental signal about the economic performance and position
generated by the business firm over time; it is fundamentally related to
the firm’s share price, but agents do not know (or agree on) the working
of this relationship;
• Ft can be positive or negative and is exogenous to the model;
• Each agent applies an individual weight ϕi ∈ [0; 1] to this signal, related to
its personal confidence degree on it, from ϕi = 0 (no confidence at all) to
ϕi = 1 (full confidence); this implies that all agents agree on the direction
(sign) of the fundamental signal, but disagree on its material impact on
the share price.
• In some specifications of the model, Ft may influence the social mood
m
j
t,k.
The social mood (or market sentiment) captures the group interaction that
generates the collective opinion on the current state of market pricing:
• mjt,k ∈ [0; 1] is the mood of group j at time t, resulting from k group
interactions (steps) starting from mjt,k=0;
• At each time t, mjt,k=0 ∈ [0; 1] exists and is exogenous to the model; in fact,
m
j
t,k=0 may be endogenous to the model; in particular, it may depends on
F .
The market clearing price (when exists) is generated by the matching
of aggregate supply and demand, which are based upon heterogeneous price
expectations by individual agents:
• pt is the market clearing price at time t;
• By assumption, pt ≥ 0;
• Et(pt+1)|
j
i is the price expectation at time t by agent i belonging to the
group j on the market clearing price at period t+ 1.
Individual investors have both group and individual heterogeneities re-
garding the formation of their expectations, which are then based upon individ-
ual and social opinions (or beliefs). In particular:
• Investors are distinguished between actual and potential shareholders. An-
alytically, they belong then to two groups j = S,D, where S denotes sup-
ply by potential sellers (actual shareholders), while D denotes demand by
potential buyers (potential shareholders);
• In each group j, the number of agents is normalized to one, with i ∈ [0; 1];
• In each group j, every agent i is characterized by an individual weight
ϕi ∈ [0; 1] that is applied to the fundamental signal Ft;
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• In each group j, agents are further characterized by the social mood mjt,k
that constitutes the market sentiment expressed by group j at time t; its
weight results from k inter-individual interactions between t− 1 and t.
3 The formation of individual expectations
Following [24] and [25], every agent forms its price expectation according to the
following generic function:
Et(pt+1)|
j
i = pt +m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1)− β
j
i
(
Et−1(pt)|
j
i − pt
)
+ γjϕiFt (1)
with j = S (Supply), D (Demand); i, ϕi ∈ [0, 1]; m
j
t,k ∈ [0, 1]; β
j
i ∈ [0; 1];
γj > 0, and
ε
j
i,t ≡
(
Et−1(pt)|
j
i − pt
)
.
This equation comprises forth elements. The first element is the past clearing
price pt. The second element is the market signal (or price trend) that is weighted
by the social opinionmjt,k of the group j at time t, expressing the group’s ongoing
market confidence. The third element is the individual forecasting revision that
consists of the difference between the past price expectation and the current
realized price. This revision is weighted by βji which may include both group
and individual heterogeneities. The forth element denotes the formation of an
individual opinion by investor i (belonging to the group j) based upon available
fundamental information Ft, which is common knowledge for both groups and
all the individual investors, and is weighted then by the individual parameter ϕi.
This structure of individual expectations follows the dual structure which the
share market process is embedded in: From the cognitive viewpoint, investors
are confronted with fundamental information from the business firm (they invest
in) from one side, and the market pricing from another side. From the financial
viewpoint, they are confronted with dividends and earnings generated by the
business firm, and the capital gains and losses involved in the market trading
(see [26] for further details). The firm side is subsumed here by the factor F ,
while the market side is captured by the price trend t−1∆t (p).
Following the Galam’s specification of the formation of social opinions [15,
16], we can define the generic function of the social mood mjt,k as follows:
m
j
t,k = f
(
m
j
t,k=0, k
j
t , Ft, Ft−1
)
where the fundamental signal F can influence kjt . For each group j = S,D,
m
j
t,k defines then the density at time t of individual investors who are confident
in the market signal or trend (m → 1), while 1− mjt,k defines the density at
time t of investors who distrust that market signal (m → 0). The initial value
m
j
t,k=0 can be exogenous or endogenous to the model setting. In particular, it
can depend on F .
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On this basis, at each time t, we assume that individual investors interact
within each group j by subgroups of a given size for k sub-periods, in order to
generate the group opinion for time t. In particular, for groups of size 3, the
density after k successive updates is
m
j
t,k = (m
j
t,k−1)
3 + 3(mjt,k−1)
2(1−mjt,k−1),
where mjt,k−1 is the proportion of agents who are confident in the market
signal at a distance of (k− 1) updates from the initial time t, k = 0. For groups
of size 4, the density after n successive updates is
m
j
t,k = (m
j
t,k−1)
4 + 4(mjt,k−1)
3{1−mjt,k−1}+ 6(1− p)(m
j
t,k−1)
2{1−mjt,k−1)
2,
where mjt,k−1 is the proportion of agents who are confident in the market
signal at a distance of (k − 1) updates from the initial time t, k = 0. The
last term includes the tie case contribution (where two ”believers” confronted
with two ”distrusters”) weighted with the probability p. Then, the social mood
(density) goes down to 0 with probability (1 − p) and up to 1 with probability
p. For a mixture of group sizes with the probability distribution ai with the
constraint
∑L
i=1 ai = 1 - where L is the largest group size and i refers to the
group size:
m
j
t,k =
L∑
i=1
ai{
i∑
j=N [ i
2
+1]
Cij(m
j
t,k−1)
j(1−mjt,k−1)
(i−j)+
(1− p)V (i)Cii
2
(mjt,k−1)
i
2 (1−mjt,k−1)
i
2 }, (2)
where Cij ≡
i!
(i−j)!j! , N [
i
2 +1] ≡ Integer Part of (
i
2 +1), m
j
t,k−1 is the proportion
of agents who believe in the market signal after (k − 1) updates, and V (i) ≡
N [ i2 ]−N [
i−1
2 ]. This implies V (i) = 1 for i even and V (i) = 0 for i odd. The
proportion of ”distrusters” is then 1−mjt,k.
It is worth to emphasize that the Galam model of opinion dynamics tangles
up three main mechanisms to produce a threshold opinion dynamics among
two competing choices within an ensemble of investors. The first mechanism is
exogenous and combines all effects which act directly and individually on the
agent to influence its own personal choice, here to trust or distrust the current
trend of the market. It determines the initial share mjt,k=0 of investors who are
respectively confident to or distrusting the market price trend. The two other
mechanisms are endogenous to the ensemble of interacting investors.
One mechanism embeds a social mimetic effect using a local majority rule,
i.e., agents confront their actual choice with the ones of a small group of other
agents and update their respective choices following the choice which was locally
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majority within the group. At the collective global level, this interactive process
produces a threshold dynamics for which the tipping point is located at precisely
fifty percent: The choice which starts with an initial support of more than fifty
percent of the investors will drive the market along its direction.
The second mechanism is more subtle and depends on the occurrence of a
local doubt within a group of investors which are settling their respective opin-
ions. In such a case, all the involved agents converge to just one common belief
about the market price trend and adopt it as their own choice. Accordingly,
within an ensemble of investors, with mjt,k percent of them expecting the trend
to be positive, a local doubting group of even size may decide to either trust
the trend with a probability of p and distrust it with a probability of (1− p).
The breaking contribution of the leading common belief is to unbalance
drastically the threshold dynamics by placing the tipping point at a value which
can be as low as 15% for the choice which goes along the common belief, and
as high as 85% for the choice which contradicts the common belief [15, 16]. For
the case of group of size four used in this work, we have respectively 23% and
77% for the tipping points. This second mechanism illustrates how the common
belief shared by some groups of investors can shape substantially the working
of the market pricing [7]over time.
4 The formation of the market clearing price
The formation of the market clearing price p∗t+1 over time depends on the aggre-
gation of individual bids of demand and supply at each period t. In particular,
every shareholder (j = S) i wishes to sell if p∗t+1 ≥ Et(pt+1)|
S
i , while every
potential buyer (j = D) i wishes to buy if p∗t+1 ≤ Et(pt+1)|
D
i . By assuming
uniform distribution of individual investors within each group j = S,D, the
individual price expectation Et(pt+1)|
j
i of investor i belonging to group j can
be rewritten as a function of expectations expressed by investors i = 0 and i = 1
defined as follows:
εt|
j
0 ≡
(
Et−1(pt)|
j
0 − pt
)
εt|
j
1 ≡
(
Et−1(pt)|
j
1 − pt
)
.
Individual price expectation by investor i may then be described as follows:
Et(pt+1)|
j
i = pt +m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1)−
(
β
j
0 (1− ϕi) ε
j
0,t + β
j
1ϕiε
j
1,t
)
+ ϕiγ
jFt
Aggregated demand and supply are now defined by the focal prices of four
representative agents with i = 0 and i = 1 ∀j = S,D. By defining:
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P
j
t ≡ maxarg
[
Et(pt+1)|
j
i=0 ; Et(pt+1)|
j
i=1
]
P
j
t ≡ min arg
[
Et(pt+1)|
j
i=0 ; Et(pt+1)|
j
i=1
]
,
the aggregate functions of supply xSt+1 and demand x
D
t+1 integrate individual
bids as follows: 

xSt+1 =
∫ p∗t+1
PSt
1
PSt −P
S
t
dx
xDt+1 =
∫ PDt
p∗t+1
1
PDt −P
D
t
dx
or, equivalently:
xSt+1 =


0 if p∗t+1 ≤ P
S
t
p∗t+1−P
S
t
PSt −P
S
t
if PSt < p
∗
t+1 < P
S
t
1 if p∗t+1 ≥ P
S
t
(3)
xDt+1 =


1 if p∗t+1 ≤ P
D
t
PDt −p
∗
t+1
PDt −P
D
t
if PDt < p
∗
t+1 < P
D
t
0 if p∗t+1 ≥ P
D
t .
(4)
The necessary condition for the existence of a market clearing price p∗t+1
(implying that both demand and supply are different from zero) is
PSt ≤ p
∗
t+1 ≤ P
D
t
This condition implies two different scenarios:
1. if PDt ≤ P
S
t , there is not matching between demand and supply; therefore,
no exchange transactions occur, and the share Exchange does not fix any
updated clearing price at period t; at the next period t + 1, investors
will then observe a special no-clearing price pNCgenerated by the market-
making process according to some external rule or device;
2. if PDt > P
S
t , there is matching, and the market clearing price p
C is defined
as the price that makes demand equal to supply.2
On this basis, the market clearing price at period t is
p∗t+1 =
{
pNC if PDt ≤ P
S
t
pC if PDt > P
S
t
2The Walrasian auction is included by this scenario when the whole share offer is satisfied.
8
Let assume that the no-clearing price pNC is fixed according to the following
rule:
pNC = pt + ǫ
where ǫ is the smallest tick value available on the share Exchange. Further-
more, concerning the clearing price pC , demand is equal to supply if
pC − PSt
PSt − P
S
t
=
PDt − p
C
PDt − P
D
t
, implying that
pC =
PDt
(
PSt − P
S
t
)
+ PSt
(
PDt − P
D
t
)
(
PDt − P
D
t
)
+
(
PSt − P
S
t
)
Therefore, the market clearing price p∗t+1 at time t is:
p∗t+1 =


pNC = pt + ǫ if PDt ≤ P
S
t
pC =
PDt
(
PSt −P
S
t
)
+PSt
(
PDt −P
D
t
)
(
PDt −P
D
t
)
+
(
PSt −P
S
t
) if PDt > PSt .
(5)
5 The dynamics of the market clearing price
In order to analyze the dynamics of the market clearing price (when it exists,
i.e., p∗t+1 = p
C) over time, let define ∀j = S,D:
Pj (n) ≡
t∑
n=1
(
−βj0
)n (
pt−n +m
j
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)
Fj (n) ≡
t∑
n=0
[(
−βj0
)n (
γjFt−n
)]
Lj (P (n) ,F (n)) ≡


∣∣∣(βj1 − βj0) ·Pj (n) + Fj (n)∣∣∣∑
j=S,D
∣∣∣(βj1 − βj0) ·Pj (n) + Fj (n)∣∣∣


−1
Mj(P (n) ,F (n)) ≡
(
β
j
1 − β
j
0
)
·Pj (n) + Fj (n) .
Accordingly,
Et(pt+1)|
j
i = pt +m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1) + β
j
0 ·P
j (n) + ϕi ·M
j(·).
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The four rapresentative agents are then described as follows:
∀j = S,D with ϕi = 0: Et(pt+1)|
j
i=0 = pt +m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1) + β
j
0 ·P
j (n)
∀j = S,D with ϕi = 1: Et(pt+1)|
j
i=0 = pt +m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1) + β
j
1 ·P
j (n) + Fj (n) .
By computation, the market clearing price function can be rewritten as
follows:
p∗t+1 = pt +
∑
j=S,D


(
m
j
t (pt − pt−1) +P
j (·)
)
L¬j (·)

+ (6)


[
M
D(·)
LS(·)
]
if Mj(·) > 0 ∀j
[
M
S(·)
LD(·)
]
if Mj(·) < 0 ∀j∑
j=S,D
[
M
j(·)
L¬j(·)
]
if MD(·) > 0
and MS(·) < 0
0
if MD(·) < 0
and MS(·) > 0
Accordingly, the pattern of market clearing price p∗t+1 is based on the his-
torical price pt by adding two further elements. The first element comprises (for
both j = S and j = D) two sub-elements:
• the numerator, mjt,k (pt − pt−1) + P
j (n), is independent from signal Ft
and dependent on the price trend ∆t (p
∗) weighted by the current group
mood mjt ,
3 and its weighted past series Pj (n);
• the denominator, Lj (·), depends on both Fj (n) which represents the
weighted fundamental signal trend series, and Pj (n) which represents
the weighted market price trend series; for each group j, this sub-element
weights the contribution of the price trend series to the formation of the
market clearing price at time t.
The second element depends on both weighted past series Fj (·) and Pj (·).
In particular, if Mj(·) is positive (negative) for both groups, then this element
increases (decreases) the market clearing price. Moreover, if Mj(·) is negative
for shareholders (j = S) while it is positive for potential investors (j = D), then
the divergence between groups is mutually balanced on the marketplace. On
the contrary, if Mj(·) is positive for shareholders while negative for potential
investors, then the divergence makes the whole element equal to zero.
3Remember that m
j
t,k
→ 1 implies full weight to this information in order to build indi-
vidual price expectations.The mood m can be influenced by the fundamental signal F , and is
the final result of the dynamic interaction within the group j for k steps occurring between
t− 1 and t.
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In sum, the formation of share prices over time depends respectively on the
dynamics of the fundamental signal F from one side, and the dynamics of the
clearing market price p from another side. Both dynamics are shaped by the
ongoing evolution of individual and group opinions (and related bids) captured
by the structure of the model.
6 An illustrative analysis of a particular speci-
fication of the model
This section shall illustrate the theoretical contribution of our model by vi-
sualizing some particular cases. For this purpose,let assume that βji = β and
γj = γ ∀j = S,D and ∀i. This specification implies that group heterogeneity is
captured by the group mood mjt,k and leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If β
j
i = β and γ
j = γ ∀j = S,D and ∀i, the group mood mjt,k
subsumes all the group heterogeneities between demand and supply; then, there
exists only one market clearing price case instead of the four cases defined above.
In particular, the individual price expectation function becomes:
Et(pt+1)|
j
i = pt +m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1) +
t∑
n=1
[
(−β)
n
(
pt−n −m
j
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)]
+
ϕi
t∑
n=0
[(−β)
n
(γFt−n)]
or Et(pt+1)|
j
i = pt +m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1) +P
j (n) + ϕiγ
jFj (n) .
Concerning the formation of the market clearing price, for βji = β ∀i, j,
Lj (·) = 2. Therefore, closer are βji ∀i, j, closer is L
j (·) to 2, implying that
the whole first element of equation 6 tends to become independent from the
fundamental signal series Fj (n). Furthermore, when βj1 , β
j
0 = β
j , Mj(·) =
Fj (n) ∀j: Closer are βj0 and β
j
1 ∀j, closer is M
j(·) to Fj (n) that is independent
from the market price trend series Pj (n). Therefore, this specification clearly
distinguishes the dual structure of the market clearing price dynamics which is
driven by two distinct factors: the market signal or trend ∆t (p
∗) weighted by
the evolution of groups’ market sentiments, and the fundamental signal F . The
market clearing price becomes:
p∗t+1 = pt +
1
2
∑
j=S,D
(
m
j
t,k (pt − pt−1) +P
j (n)
)
+
[
F (n)
2
]
where
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Pj (n) ≡
t∑
n=1
(−β)
n
(
pt−n +m
j
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)
F (n) ≡
t∑
n=0
[(−β)
n
(γFt−n)]
Accordingly, the dynamics of the market clearing price (when it exists) is
denoted as follows:
∆t+1 (p
∗) ≡ pt+1 − pt = f
(
∆t (p
∗) ,mjt,k
)
+ g (F (n))
This price pattern comprises two different elements. The first element,
f
(
∆t (p
∗) ,mjt,k
)
, is a group factor that depends on the market signal ∆t (p
∗)
weighted by the group moodmjt,k that is collectively assigned to the market price
trend by group j at time t. The second element, g (F (n)) = F(n)2 , depends on
the weighted trend of the fundamental signal Ft, with F
j (n) = FD (n) = FS (n)
in this particular specification. Consequently, if F (n) is positive (negative), then
g (F (n)) proportionally increases (decreases) the market clearing price at time
t.
6.1 Illustrative case of a constant trend in the fundamen-
tal signal
Let illustrate this particular specification of the model when the fundamental
signal experiences an alternate positive and negative trend: Ft = ±0.1 every 10
periods of t. Let assume: βji = β = 0.5; γ
j = γ = 1; ǫ = 0.01; p0 = 10; F0 = 0;
mSt,k=0 = 0.6; m
D
t,k=0 = 0.4; εt=0|
j
i = 0.1 · (U(0; 1)−U(0; 1)), ∀j = S,D and ∀i.
The group interaction is based on groups of size 3, 4 (with pD = pS = 0.3) and
4 (with pD = 0.3 and pS = 0.3). The probability p means here that, in case of
group inderterminacy, the group belief tends to trust the market (p→ 1) or not
(p→ 0). We perform simulations for periods from t = 1 to t = 100, with various
k from 0 to 7. In this case, the market clearing price and the fundamental signal
change at the same rhythm t, while the market sentiment changes at its rhythm
k from 0 (no steps, implying no change from the initial value) to 7 (seven steps
between t− 1 and t). Figures 1a,b,c illustrate the result.
The simulation shows that changes in the market sentiment exacerbates the
impact of the fundamental signal on the market clearing price over time. The
resulting market price remains under- or over-valuated the shares relative to
their fundamental price computed as follows:4
pFt = p
F
t−1 + Ft−1 = p0 +
t−1∑
n=0
Fn.
4By definition, the first market price and the first fundamental price are equal.
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Figure 1: Simulation for groups of size 3
Figure 2: Simulation for groups of size 4 (pD = pS = 0.3
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Figure 3: Simulation for groups of size 4 (with pD = 0.6 and pS = 0.4)
6.2 Illustrative case of market exuberance
Under the same conditions, let assume that the fundamental signal experiences
a random pattern: Ft = U(0; 1) − U(0; 1) ∀t ≥ 1. We perform simulations for
periods from t = 1 to t = 100, with various k from 0 to 7. In this case, the
market clearing price and the fundamental signal change at the same rhythm
t, while the market sentiment changes at its rhythm k from 0 (no change) to 7
(seven steps between t− 1 and t). Figures 2a,b,c illustrate the result.
The simulation shows that changes in the market sentiment exacerbates the
market exuberance around the path provided by the fundamental price pFt . This
result is in line with theoretical and empirical analyses of market exuberance
discussed by [27] and [28] among others.
6.3 Illustrative case of market disconnection from funda-
mental price
The latter case shows a distinctive pattern where the market price disconnects
from the fundamental price over time. Figures 3a,b,c illustrate this result.
The simulation shows that the dynamics of the clearing price may be discon-
nected by the dynamics of fundamental price pFt over time. This implies that
the formation of a market clearing price over time is not sufficient to assure that
market pricing is aligned on the fundamental price that arises from fundamentals
that are common knowledge among heterogeneous market participants.
7 Conclusive remarks
Financial economic models often assume that investors know (or agree on) the
fundamental value of the firm’s shares that are traded, easing the passage from
14
Figure 4: Simulation for groups of size 3
Figure 5: Simulation for groups of size 4 (pD = pS = 0.3)
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Figure 6: Simulation for groups of size 4 (with pD = 0.6 and pS = 0.4)
Figure 7: Simulation for groups of size 3
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Figure 8: Simulation for groups of size 4 (pD = pS = 0.3)
Figure 9: Simulation for groups of size 4 (with pD = 0.6 and pS = 0.4)
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the individual to the collective dimension of the financial system generated by
the Share Exchange over time. Our model relaxes that heroic assumption of one
unique ”true value” and deals with the formation of share market prices through
the dynamic formation of individual and social opinions (or beliefs) based upon
a fundamental signal of economic performance and position of the firm, the
forecast revision by heterogeneous individual investors, and their social mood
or sentiment about the ongoing state of the market pricing process. Market
clearing price formation is then featured by individual and group dynamics that
make its collective dimension irreducible to its individual level.
This dynamic holistic approach provides a better understanding of the mar-
ket exuberance generated by the Share Exchange over time. This exuberance
depends not only on individual biases or mistakes, but also on dynamic and
collective dimensions that arise from the interaction of individuals among them
and with evolving collective structures over time. Our model captures this col-
lective dimension through the evolution of available common knowledge on the
economic performance and position of the firm (fundamental or firm-specific
information), as well as through the evolving social mood or sentiment on the
current state of the market (or the industry, or the whole economy). While the
former can be related to information release by accounting reporting and dis-
closure, the latter can be related to investors’ confidence and financial analysts’
consensus, and their respective evolution over socio-economic time and space
where the financial market is embedded.
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Appendix
For sake of completeness, we provide here various other versions of the market
price equation. Starting from equation 6, let define:
λt ≡
∣∣MS∣∣
|MS|+ |MD|
= LS (P (n) ,F (n))−1
(1− λt) ≡
∣∣MD∣∣
|MS|+ |MD|
= LD (P (n) ,F (n))−1
with Mj(·) =
(
β
j
1 − β
j
0
)
·Pj (n) + Fj (n) = −
(
β
j
1ε
j
1,t − β
j
0ε
j
0,t
)
+ γjFt
Or, equivalently:
λt =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
βS1 − β
S
0
) t∑
n=1
[(
−βS0
)n (
pt−n +m
S
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)]
+
t∑
n=0
[(
−βD0
)n (
γDFt−n
)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j=S,D
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
β
j
1 − β
j
0
) t∑
n=1
[(
−βj0
)n (
pt−n +m
j
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)]
+
t∑
n=0
[(
−βj0
)n (
γjFt−n
)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
and
(1− λt) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
βD1 − β
D
0
) t∑
n=1
[(
−βD0
)n (
pt−n +m
D
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)]
+
t∑
n=0
[(
−βD0
)n (
γDFt−n
)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
j=S,D
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
β
j
1 − β
j
0
) t∑
n=1
[(
−βj0
)n (
pt−n +m
j
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)]
+
t∑
n=0
[(
−βj0
)n (
γjFt−n
)]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Therefore, the market clearing equation can be rewritten as follows:
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p∗t+1 = pt + λtm
D
t (pt − pt−1) + (1− λt)m
S
t (pt − pt−1)+
λt
(
βD0 ε
D
0,t
)
+ (1− λt)
(
βS0 ε
S
0,t
)
+

λt
[(
βD1 ε
D
1,t − β
D
0 ε
D
0,t
)
+ γDt Ft
]
if Mj > 0
(1− λt)
[(
βS1 ε
S
1,t − β
S
0 ε
S
1,t
)
+ γSt Ft
]
if Mj < 0
λt
[(
βD1 ε
D
1,t − β
D
0 ε
D
0,t
)
+ γDt Ft
]
+
(1− λt)
[(
βS1 ε
S
1,t − β
S
0 ε
S
1,t
)
+ γSt Ft
] if MD > 0
and MS < 0
0
if MD < 0
and MS > 0
Or, equivalently:
p∗t+1 = pt + λtm
D
t (pt − pt−1) + (1− λt)m
S
t (pt − pt−1)+
λt
t∑
n=1
[(
−βD0
)n (
pt−n +m
D
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)]
+
(1− λt)
t∑
n=1
[(
−βS0
)n (
pt−n +m
S
t−n (pt−n − pt−n−1)− pt−n+1
)]
+


λt
[
MD(·)
]
if Mj > 0 ∀j
(1− λt)
[
MS(·)
]
if Mj < 0 ∀j
λt
[
MD(·)
]
+ (1− λt)
[
MS(·)
] if MD > 0
and MS < 0
0
if MD < 0
and MS > 0
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